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ABSRACT 
The major focus of this paper is on the relationship between political, 
social and economic institutions and Foreign Direct Investment in 
developing economies. 
For a decade, the relationship between institutions and Foreign Direct 
Investment has been receiving growing attention. The link between the 
quality of institutions and FDI in developing countries, especially in 
transition economies, has led scholars to focus on the quality of 
institutions as determinants of FDI in developing countries. 
This paper explores how social economic and political institutions help 
explain cross-country variations in Foreign Direct Investment flows by 
applying Panel data regressions including 67 developing countries for the 
period 1984-2005.  
 
The findings suggest that better perceptions of the quality of institutions 
have overall a positive and economically significant effect on FDI. 
Especially, the unpredictability of laws, political and economic 
instabilities, government instability and high level of corruption play a 
major role in deterring FDI. 
 
Introduction  
   
Since the late 1990s, in the international literature, studies on the 
impacts of institutions have been pioneered by economic historians studying 
the differences in the economic growth performance of the countries in the 
world. A number of scholars such as Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), 
Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoğlu, Johnson and Robinson (2002, 2005) have 
emphasized that political, institutional and legal environment of a 
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country, to a great extent, determine the economic performance.  
 
These scholars emphasize that the institutional structure of a country is a 
key explanation of cross-country differences in both growth rates and 
income per capita. The low level of economic, financial and political 
risks, efficient protection of civil and property rights, the functioning 
of law and judicial systems, the enforcement of laws and contracts and low 
level of corruption have been related to higher prosperity of a country.  
 
At the same time, as mentioned, there has been a growing interest in the 
determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. 
Since 1980, with the liberalization of developing economies, the volume of 
FDI flows into these countries has grown significantly. Plus, the recent 
experience of a number of countries – especially in Central Europe and East 
Asia – has shown that FDI can play a crucial and catalytic role in the 
development process (FIAS, 2001). Hence, FDI is perceived by many 
governments of developing countries as one of the most stable components of 
capital flows and an important factor for economic growth. As the FDI-
promoting effect of good institutions may be an important channel of their 
overall effect on growth and development, to study the links between FDI 
and institutions has become relevant. 
   
However, not all developing countries attract the equal amount of FDI; 
rather, the distribution of FDI flows is unequal in developing economies. 
Therefore in this paper, I intend to build a theoretical framework focusing 
on the questions of why developing countries differ vastly in their success 
in attracting FDI. 
 
Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment  
 
One of the most notable features of economic globalization has been the 
increased importance of foreign direct investment around the world. With 
the trends of globalization, liberalization in foreign currency and trade 
regimes, the volume of trade and FDI increased throughout the world. Since 
the early 1980s, Foreign Direct Investment stock has grown rapidly - faster 
than world trade (UNCTAD, 2006). The dramatic rise in FDI flows in recent 
years stands out as one of the most decisive factors in globalization of 
economic activity and FDI is viewed as a measure of the extent to which a 
country or a region is integrating into the world economy. 
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As seen in figure 1, since 1980, the FDI inflows to developing countries 
have been substantially increasing and compared to other capital flows, has 
remained the largest component of net resource flows to developing 
countries.  
 
Fig. 1 Total net resource flows to developing countries, by type of flow, 1990-2005 
(Billions of dollars) 
 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2006:5, based on World Bank 2006.  
Although the share of FDI increases in both developed and developing 
countries, there is a massive variation in FDI performance across 
countries. In other words, not all regions receive the same amount of FDI. 
FDI inflows are dominated by the developed countries and also there is a 
massive variation in FDI performance across developing countries.1   
 
As seen in Figure 2, FDI flows are unevenly distributed among countries in 
the world. The share of developed countries has remained between 60 and 75 
percent, in general, while the share of developing countries has remained 
between 15 and 35 percent for more than 30 years. In addition, the share of 
top five economies in the world FDI inflows was 70 percent in 1980 and it 
was 50 percent in 2005 and five developing economies attracted nearly 20 
percent of FDI flows in 2005. Therefore asking the question, “Why do 
developing economies attract FDI unevenly?” seems reasonable.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 South, East and South-East Asia are the main magnets for inflows to developing 
countries. FDI inflows into these regions reached $165 billion in 2005, 
corresponding to 18 percent of world inflows. 
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Fig. 2 Concentration of FDI inflows: the share of the top 5 FDI recipients in the 
world total, 1980-2005 (Per cent). 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Development Report, 2006, p.4. 
 
  
 
Comprising more than half of the world's population, many developing 
economies are often featured with strong market demand and high growth 
rates. The recent progress they have made in economic liberalization, 
especially after 1980 is noteworthy. In many of these countries the entry 
of MNCs is welcome as it represents an inflow of foreign savings into the 
country, supplementing domestic savings and directly increasing the level 
of investment.  
 
However, the FDI performances of these countries vary. Figure 3 shows the 
FDI stock as percentage of GDP in some of the developing economies. Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Chile are the most successful countries receiving FDI 
stock over 50 percent of their GDP. On the other hand, Philippines, Turkey, 
Korea and India receive low level of FDI stock when compared to their 
market sizes.  
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Fig. 3 FDI stock as percentage of GDP in selected developing economies – 2005. 
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Source: UNCTAD (2006), WDI (2006). 
 
The uneven distribution of FDI stock in these countries can be analyzed by 
taking into consideration that these economies are not homogeneous. The 
size of markets, economic growth rates and economic development stages vary 
among countries. Further, the stage of economic development, political, 
regulatory and legal regimes differ across emerging markets.  
 
Before answering the question by giving details about the empiric results 
of econometric model to propose a theoretical framework is essential.  
 
Concepts, Definitions 
This paper focuses on one of the most stable of the international capital 
flows, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). According to one of the oldest 
definitions of Foreign Direct Investment, by Kindleberger, FDI is referred 
to as long-term capital flow and differs from portfolio investment by 
taking place in kind, through the exchange of property (patents, technology 
or machinery) and by acquiring control of a company Kindleberger, 1969:2). 
It also differs from other kinds of international capital movements in that 
direct investment proceeds by the reinvestment of profits and accompanied 
by varying degrees of control, plus technology and management.2  
                                                 
2 However, some definitions put more emphasis on the “control” factor. OECD 
recommends that a direct investment enterprise be defined as an incorporated or 
unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10 per cent or more of 
the ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated enterprise or the equivalent 
of an unincorporated enterprise….An effective voice in the management, as evidenced 
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Investing abroad by MNCs constructing subsidiaries called “Greenfield 
Investment”, whereas, these firms may also invest abroad, a common form in 
developed countries, by investing in established firms, through mergers and 
acquisitions, or through privatization programs (called as Brownfield 
Investment). Several developing economies have received this form of FDI 
due to the privatization programs took place especially after 1980. 
 
The motives for investing abroad either by establishing a new corporation 
or investing in established firms have received remarkable attention from 
scholars. Their main concern is answering the question: What explains 
patterns of FDI flows across the globe?  
Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment  
 
There is a vast literature on the determinants of FDI. Especially, the 
empirical studies vary in terms of the variables, methodologies, the 
characteristics of FDI and the countries.  The main studies on the 
determinants of the FDI flows can be classified into two categories, firm-
level centered and studies including non-economic factors.  
 
The early writings on FDI go back only to the 1950s. In the literature, 
Stephen Herbert Hymer made the first theoretical approach asserting that 
FDI took place because the corporation making the investment possessed some 
special skill or techniques not available to local entrepreneurs that it 
could exploit only through direct ownership (Hymer, 1976:34-38).   
 
Through 1960 and 1970 new theories of FDI were introduced. Vernon (1966) 
used the product life cycle approach, which is based on the existence of 
market imperfections across nations, to develop a theory of foreign direct 
investment. Later, Caves (1971) argued that monopolistic advantages, which 
are created by both advertising and research and development investments, 
characterize not just specific firms but rather firms within oligopolistic 
industries. Knickerbocker (1973) showed evidence that the timing of U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                        
by an ownership of at least 10 percent, implies that the direct investor is able to 
influence, or participate in the management of an enterprise; it does not require 
absolute control by the foreign investor” (OECD, (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development); OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct 
Investment, 3d Edition (Paris: OECD, 1996), p.8. For a detail study about 
definitions of FDI, see R. E. Lipsey, “Foreign Direct Investment and the Operations 
of Multinational Firms: Concepts, History and Data. Working Paper 8665 National 
Bureau of Economic Research 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge:NBER, MA 02138 
(December 2001). 
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MNCs’ FDI is largely determined by their oligopolistic reaction “follow the 
leader” theory to competitors’ investment. While industrial organization 
models were the dominant line in studying FDI until the 1970s, a new 
theory, called “internationalization theory,” was proposed to explain how 
firms are involved in international operations and make resource 
commitments to foreign markets. 
 
In the 1970s, Dunning’s (1970) eclectic paradigm dominated the literature 
and has remained the center of FDI theory and other scholars have expanded 
on this framework. Dunning introduced the concept of “OLI” as a theoretical 
framework to analyze the determinants of FDI. This framework considers FDI 
as determined by Ownership, Location and Internalization advantages of 
firms investing abroad (Dunning, 1981). The ownership advantage refers to a 
product or a production process to which local firms do not have access. It 
could refer to a patent or an intangible advantage like a reputation for 
quality. The location advantage comes directly from the foreign market, 
such as low factor prices or consumer access, along with trade barriers or 
transport costs, which makes FDI more profitable than exporting. Finally, 
the internalization advantage is a concept that explains why a firm prefers 
investing rather than licensing. The internalization advantage implies that 
since markets for intermediate products are difficult to organize, these 
transactions can be handled more efficiently within the firm by an internal 
hierarchy rather than by the external market (Buckley and Casson, 1976).  
 
More recently, the motives of FDI have been examined in two categories. In 
this view a firm realizes the investment to better serve the local market 
or to get lower-cost inputs, or both. In other words, FDI can be divided 
into “horizontal” or “market-seeking” FDI, and “vertical” or “efficiency 
seeking” FDI (Michalet, 1997:12-15). The first involves building plants in 
a host country to supply the local market. This approach is done to reduce 
the costs that arise from supplying the market through exporting, in which 
case, market size and high tariffs play a large role in determining 
profitability. The latter category of vertical FDI is production cost-
minimizing, where firms seek to produce in lower cost locations or seek 
inexpensive inputs in order to export their product. Inexpensive inputs 
include natural resources, raw materials, or low-cost inputs such as labor. 
Finally, Asset Seeking FDI is the most recent motive for FDI to be 
identified. It refers to a strategy that aims to access and exploit 
technological assets in overseas countries. Developed countries are the 
main recipients for R&D investment, but countries such as Hungary, Czech 
Republic, India and Brazil are also attracting more and more Research and 
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Development projects. Asset seeking MNCs focus on the skilled labor 
availability, research institutes, large supply of graduate labor, created 
assets including innovative capacity, technological adoption, and technical 
skills when choosing an investing location.  
 
These approaches are firm-level centered, yet, in these studies the role of 
social, political and economic institutions has rarely been treated. These 
studies emphasize that firms as profit maximizing agents are motivated by 
exploiting their own advantages abroad, such as access to patented 
technology, specific management or marketing skills or ownership of brand 
names.  
 
On the other hand, since the 1990s, the number of studies examining the 
role of institutions as determinants of foreign direct investment has been 
increasing. In this paper, my aim is not to provide a comprehensive list of 
studies in the New Institutionalist Economics literature. The focus is, 
rather, on identifying a set of key institutional variables that has an 
impact on Foreign Direct Investment.  
 
Institutions 
 
In the literature there are several empirical studies using institutional 
variables. In most of these studies, it is argued that lack of political 
and economic stability, unclear regulatory frameworks, an inexperienced 
bureaucracy, an underdeveloped court system, and corruption deter more FDI 
flows into host economies.  
 
The New Institutionalist Approach regards a nation’s institutional 
framework as the most important factor determining its economic performance 
over time and introduced the role of institutions by focusing on the 
quality of domestic institutions as a key explanation of cross-country 
differences in growth rates and income per capita. 
 
The word “institution” has a variety of meanings in the institutional 
economics literature. In this paper “institutions” are accepted as “the 
rules of the game” in a society which is defined by North (1991:97): 
“Institutions are the rules, the regulations, (humanly devised constraints) 
that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of 
both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes 
of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)”. They 
reduce the uncertainty involved in human interaction by giving us patterns 
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for our behavior. In addition, institutions lead to a fall in both 
transaction and information costs by reducing uncertainty and establishing 
a therefore stable structure to facilitate interactions (North, 1990:3).  
 
 
The role of Institutional Variables – Literature Review 
 
Empirical research on the impact of host country institutions on FDI has 
demonstrated that the general institutional, social and legal framework 
influences FDI. An efficient legal infrastructure reduces institutional 
uncertainties for foreign investors, facilitates establishment and 
enforcement of contracts and in various other ways reduces the transaction 
costs in an economy.  
 
There is a vast literature on the effects on political, economic and social 
institutional variables on FDI flows. The governance indicators developed 
by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) were used to explore the role 
of institutional variables as determinants of the location of FDI. These 
indicators are constructed on the basis of information gathered through a 
wide variety of cross-country surveys as well as polls of experts, and are 
available for a large cross-section of countries. Each indicator represents 
a different dimension of governance: political voice and accountability, 
political instability, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of 
law.  
 
Busse and Carsten (2005) explore the linkages between political risk, 
institutions and foreign direct investment inflows by using different 
econometric techniques for a data sample of 83 developing countries and the 
period 1984 to 2003. They employed 12 different indicators for political 
risk and institutions in the empirical analysis. They found that the 
investment profile, internal and external conflict, ethnic tensions and 
democratic accountability are important determinants of FDI flows. Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) examine American firms investing abroad and write that 
political risk factors, the functioning of the bureaucracy, corruption and 
judicial system have strong impact on these firms. Using a time series 
analysis, Jun and Singh (1996) found that when political risk is high FDI 
affected negatively. Gastanga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998) examine the 
relationship between political variables and found that high enforcement 
mechanisms, low corruption levels affect FDI positively. 
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Although several studies put emphasis on the positive role of increasing 
quality of political institutions on FDI flows, in the international 
literature there is a debate on the impacts of some institutional variables 
on FDI. One of these variables is corruption. Due to the lack of reliable 
data on corruption, testing the theories becomes difficult, though; the 
number of studies dealing with the issue by using various comparative 
methods has been increasing. In order to measure the level of corruption in 
a country, various international organizations such as the Political Risk 
Service (PRS), Transparency International (TI), the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES) of the World Bank, the Global Competitiveness 
Report, and the Freedom House apply questionnaire surveys or other methods 
to a number of MNCs operating in host economies. Using these data scholars 
examine the relationship among corruption and economic growth and FDI. 
 
Foreign investors perceive corruption as an impediment to invest in the 
host country. Corruption is seen as an extra cost for operations and it can 
affect FDI directly by tarnishing the perception of the stability and 
quality of an investment potential. 
 
However, the effect of corruption on economic growth, in specific, on FDI, 
has been subject to debate. Some argued that, bribes act as speed money and 
help avoid bureaucratic inefficiencies, plus, corruption is claimed to have 
a beneficial face which is known as the “greasing the wheel” (Leff, 1964).3 
According to this view, corruption has harmful long-term effects, but it 
can “grease the wheels” of the economy in the short-term. Also, in cases of 
developing countries, where the government is inefficient, corruption may 
be the only way to encourage investment by offering alternative ways to 
conduct business.     
 
However, over time, the empirical evidence of the negative effects of 
corruption on economic growth and FDI flows has steadily increased. For 
instance, Paulo Mauro (1997) uses the Business International (BI) indices 
to argue that corruption does in fact hurt growth and investment. In his 
study on 67 countries, Mauro argued corruption can affect FDI directly by 
ruining the perception of stability and quality of an investment potential, 
therefore investors may not prefer to invest because of extra costs. Mauro 
found that if a country could heighten the efficiency of its administration 
and improve its corruption score from four out of ten to six out ten, the 
                                                 
3 Huntington argued that a “rigid, over centralized dishonest bureaucracy” is better 
than a “rigid, over centralized, honest bureaucracy”.See S. Huntington Political 
Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 
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rate of investment would increase by three percent and the growth rate 
would increase by 0.5 percent.  
 
The findings of several studies on relationship between corruption and FDI 
support the corruption-growth argument above. Smarynzka and Wei (2000) 
argue that host country corruption induces foreign investors to favor joint 
ventures over wholly owned firms. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) examine the 
impact of corruption on FDI and the results of their study suggest that 
foreign investors generally avoid corruption because it is considered wrong 
and it can create operational inefficiencies. Wei (1997) also found a 
result that corruption has a negative effect on FDI. In addition, he 
mentions the weak enforcement mechanisms and political instability mean 
uncertainty for FDI and affects investment decision negatively. Larrain and 
Tavares (2004) analyzed the effect of openness to foreign direct investment 
on corruption. They found that foreign direct investment is a robust 
determinant of corruption. Larger FDI inflows decrease national corruption.  
The studies on the effects of democracy on macroeconomic performance and 
FDI, as in the case of corruption, are relatively divergent in the 
literature. Some studies question the contribution of democratic regimes on 
FDI. For instance, Oneal(1999) states that authoritarian regimes provide 
investors with higher returns in developing countries which may affect the 
investment decision.  
 
According to these views, authoritarian regimes, in the bargaining process, 
may offer businesses the opportunity to influence policy decisions as well. 
In his study, Resnick (2001) analyzes how democratic transition affects 
FDI, and not considering the role of property rights independent of 
democratic institutions, he emphasizes that transition to democracy has a 
statistically significant negative effect on FDI. Przeworski and Limongi 
(1993) argue that the relationship between democracy and economic growth is 
more complex than once thought. In a statistical analysis Przeworski, 
Limongi, Alvarez and Cheibub (2000) find that there is no difference 
between the growth rates of democratic and authoritarian regimes. 
On the other hand, several scholars mention the importance of the impact of 
democracy on economic growth and FDI. For instance, Olson (1991) argued 
that ensuring property rights is a central element of economic development 
and these result in the growth of democracies at faster rates than 
authoritarian regimes in which ensuring property rights are not credibly 
committed by autocrats. Oxley (1999), Smarzynska (1999) found that weak 
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property rights inhibit FDI inflows. In a study on democracy and FDI,  
Jensen (2006) states that the overall effect of democratic institutions 
should be positive and democracies should be associated with higher inflows 
of FDI. He states that information, representation, and credibility in 
democracies make easier things for foreign investors (Jensen, 2006:72-100).  
In his study, Busse (2004)examines the relationship between democratic 
rights and FDI and argues that a country which protects democratic rights 
receives more FDI than other countries. In other words, multinational firms 
prefer to invest in countries in which democratic rights are under 
protected. Maskus (2000), studying the impact of intellectual property 
rights on FDI, finds that a one per cent increase in degree of patent 
protection in host economy raises US investment stock by 0.45 per cent. 
Methodology and Variables of the Econometric Model 
Scholars when applying econometric models use data collected by 
international organizations. However, institutional variables are not 
readily available.  
 
To meet the needs for an in-depth and exhaustively researched analysis of 
the non-economic variables such as potential risks to international 
business operations, several organizations created statistical models to 
calculate risks and backed it up with analyses that explain the numbers and 
examine what the numbers do not show. The result is a comprehensive system 
that enables various types of risk to be measured and compared between 
countries. 
 
The data measuring the quality of institutional variables are produced by 
independent private firms who provide consulting services to international 
investors such as the PRS Group publishing the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), the Freedom House (FH), or the Transparency International 
(TI). To a certain extent, these indices provide very similar information 
on various aspects of institutions. However, some should pay attention to 
the facts that first indices can be considered to be subjective and more 
important, they measure the perceptions of governance quality rather than 
its actual quality. 
Therefore, in this paper, what I am concerned about is not the actual 
institutional quality, but its perceptions on the quality of institutions.4  
                                                 
4 For more detail about the “perception of institutions” see Ahmet Faruk Aysan, 
Mustapha Kamel Nablı, and Marie Ange Veganzones—Varoudakis “Governance institutions 
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In this paper, the effects of both macroeconomic and institutional 
variables on FDI inflows are analyzed in 67 developing economies. The 
dependent variable is the FDI inflows/Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (UNCTAD, 
2006). This measure is useful to compare the relative FDI performances of 
the countries. As explanatory variables, macroeconomic variables are GDP 
growth, GDP per capita (PPP), openness (Export+Import/GDP), and GDP 
deflator. Political and economic institutional variables are democratic 
accountability, civil liberties, political rights, law and order, 
corruption, government stability, investment profile, and socioeconomic 
conditions.  
 
Definitions of the Variables   
 
The first category of explanatory variables includes macroeconomic 
variables. As stated before, market size is one of the most widely proven 
significant determining variables in FDI location. If foreign investors are 
looking to sell their product or service to the host country, the economic 
potential of the targeted region is of utmost importance. This will be 
measured by GDP per capita. Because of differences in consumer purchasing 
power more-developed countries often attract more FDI than less-developed 
ones. This measure should have a significant impact on FDI inflows because 
it indicates market wealth and purchasing power. The variable is converted 
to international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates for 
comparability between countries. GDP per capita as an indicator of economic 
development is expected to affect FDI inflows positively. Data are from the 
IMF (2007).  
 
In addition to GDP per capita, I use of GDP growth.  GDP growth indicates a 
precondition for economic expansion. Economic growth should affect FDI 
inflows positively; hence, I include GDP growth as independent variable. 
Data are from the World Development Indicators (2006). Openness indicates 
integration of a country into World Economy. It is estimated as exports 
plus imports, as a percentage of GDP and it is expected to be significant 
because it demonstrates the openness and trade abilities of the host 
country. The data are from WDI (2006). The last macroeconomic variable in 
the model is GDP deflator (annual percent). Many developing economies 
                                                                                                                                                        
and private investment: An Application to the Middle East and North Africa” in The 
Developing Economies, XLV-3 (September 2007): 339–77. 
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experienced high levels of inflation in the 1980s and 1990s. Inflation not 
only deters foreign investment but also investment environment in a 
country. Therefore, low inflation is expected to attract FDI while high 
inflation rates deter FDI. The data are from the WDI (2006).  
 
The second category of explanatory variables includes political 
institutions:  
 
Government Stability (GS) is a measure of the government's ability to stay 
in office and carry out its declared program(s), depending upon such 
factors as the type of governance, cohesion of the government and governing 
parties, approach of an election, and command of the legislature. 
Corruption (C)within the political system that is a threat, especially in 
the long-run, to foreign investment by distorting the economic and 
financial environment, reducing the efficiency of government and business 
by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather 
than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the political 
process. Investment Profile (IP) is an assessment of factors affecting the 
risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic and 
financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation and 
Payment Delays. Socioeconomic conditions (SC) indicator is an assessment of 
the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain 
government action or fuel social dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned 
is the sum of three subcomponents; unemployment, consumer confidence and 
poverty. Law and Order (LA) are assessed separately, with each sub-
component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-component is an 
assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the 
Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. 
Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms of its judicial 
system, but a low rating - 1 – if it suffers from a very high crime rate of 
if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example, 
widespread illegal strikes). The institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy (BQ) is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions 
of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to 
countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern 
without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. 
In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat 
autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for 
recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a 
strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends 
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to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day 
administrative functions. Political rights (PR) enable people to 
participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote 
freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for 
public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect 
representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are 
accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties (CL) allow for the freedoms 
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of 
law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. 
 
Methodology 
Before introducing the model, the methodology should be initiated. In this 
paper, the econometric model includes two approaches; factor analysis and 
principal component analysis. This is because of there is high correlation 
between variables.  
 
Table 1 shows that there are high correlations between the institutional 
variables. Using factor analysis these institutional variables can be 
explained in terms of a much smaller number of variables called factors. 
The purpose of factor analysis is to discover simple patterns between the 
variables and reduction of number of variables, combining two or more 
variables into a single factor.  In order to test if I could use factor 
analysis for this variable group I use Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin criterion (for 
detailed information see appendix). Computed Kaiser's MSA is bigger than 
0,5.  It indicates that factor analysis could be used. I use maximum 
likelihood method for factor analyzing.  
 
Using Minimum average partial method I found 2 factors. The first group 
DEMOC includes Civil Liberties (CL), Political Rights (PR) and Democratic 
Accountability (DA). The second group POL includes Government Stability 
(GS), Investment Profile (IP), Bureaucratic Quality (BQ), Law and Order 
(LO), Corruption and Socioeconomic Conditions (SC). Their factor loadings 
can be seen in the appendix.  
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Table 1. Correlation for institutional variables  
 
 BQ DA GS IP LO N_CL N_PR SC 
 
BQ  1.000000  0.406254  0.223212  0.344010  0.437876  0.212655  0.246968  0.412445 
DA  0.406254  1.000000  0.168704  0.367918  0.302073  0.531678  0.595366  0.086496 
GS  0.223212  0.168704  1.000000  0.598368  0.343915  0.090128  0.065509  0.038455 
IP  0.344010  0.367918  0.598368  1.000000  0.331729  0.332767  0.300780  0.332150 
LO  0.437876  0.302073  0.343915  0.331729  1.000000  0.174831  0.173786  0.351615 
CL  0.212655  0.531678  0.090128  0.332767  0.174831  1.000000  0.868202  0.090053 
PR  0.246968  0.595366  0.065509  0.300780  0.173786  0.868202  1.000000  0.101990 
SC  0.412445  0.086496  0.038455  0.332150  0.351615  0.090053  0.101990  1.000000 
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  The first equation (eq1) includes only macroeconomic variables:  
_ _ -2.818641 0.000173* _ _ 0.078* _
0.052689* 3.82E-06* _
FDI inflows Gdp Gdp pc ppp Gdp growth
Openness Gdp def
= + +
+ −  
  The second equation (eq4) includes both macroeconomic and 
institutional variables: 
 
_ _ -2.177220 0.000109 * _ _
0.062488 * _ 0.049188 * 4.95E-06 * _
0.666885 * 0.536699 *
Fdi inflows Gdp Gdp pc ppp
Gdp growth Openness Gdp def
DA POL
= − +
+ + −
+ +  
Estimation Results 
Equations (1) and (4) have been estimated on an unbalanced panel of  67 
developing countries over 1984–2005  using the OLS estimations technique. 
Four sets of regressions have been conducted, each one with a different 
institutional indicator. 
 
Table 2 indicates the estimation results with Panel Fixed effects for the 
equation 1 Table 1 presents the estimation’s results of equations (1) and 
(2) when “macroeconomic conditions”, “democratic accountability” and 
“political stability” are taken into consideration respectively.   
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Table 2. Determinants of FDI, the role of macroeconomic and institutional variables 
for 67 developing economies 1984-2005  
 
          
  Eq1  Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 
          
C -2.818641 -2.524737 -2.546381 -2.17722 
   (0.284220)*** (0.288135)*** (0.293447)*** (0.297557)*** 
        
GDP_PC_PPP 0.000173 0.000151 0.000141 0.000109 
    
(3.95E-
059)*** (3.94E-05)*** (4.04E-05)*** (4.04E-05)*** 
        
GDP_GROWTH    0.078413 0.073894 0.068999 0.062488 
    (0.016547)*** (0.016480)*** (0.016733)*** (0.016591)*** 
     
OPENNESS 0.052689 0.050499 0.051619 0.049188 
   (0.004295)*** (0.004286)*** (0.004295)*** (0.004271)*** 
       
GDP_DEF  -3.82E-06 -5.12E-06 -3.57E-06 -4.95E-06 
   (2.15E-06)* (2.14E-06)** (2.14E-06)* (2.13E-06)** 
     
DEMOC  0.606131  0.666885 
    (0.118154)***  (0.118271)*** 
     
POL   0.452479 0.536699 
     (0.125385)*** (0.124922)*** 
          
 
Sources: The macroeconomic series are from WDI and IMF. The institutional variables 
have been processed from various international sources.  The “democratic 
accountability” DEMOC and “political stability” POL indexes are from PRS (2006) and 
Freedom House (2006) data.  
***, **, and * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. For 
the country sample see appendix. 
 
 A significant conclusion of the model consists in validating the mainstream 
theory of the firm in the case of developing countries. The macroeconomic 
variables have the expected signs, which imply that anticipations of 
economic growth, GDP per capita and openness of the economy induce more FDI. 
In addition, the inflation appears to exert a negative and significant 
effect on FDI.  
 
Both variables are highly significant, indicating that market related 
factors constitute major factors for the entrepreneurs to establish 
operations abroad.  
 
In the following equations I add institutional variables one by one. The 
equation 4 includes the all macroeconomic and institutional variables. One 
of the most interesting outcomes concerns the quality of democratic 
accountability and political stability indices, which both give positive and 
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significant coefficients at the 1 percent level in the equation (4). This 
result confirm that a low level of corruption, a good quality of 
bureaucracy, protected political rights and civil liberties, a reasonable 
investment environment, a better law and order, and government stability  
are of first importance for the foreign investors’ decisions to invest. In 
other words, the increase in perception of the quality of institutions 
affects FDI inflows positively.  
 
The coefficients of all macroeconomic and institutional variables are 
statistically significant. Again all signs are as expected. 
A significant conclusion of the model consists in validating the mainstream 
theory of the firm in the case of developing countries. The macroeconomic 
variables have the expected signs, which imply that anticipations of 
economic growth, GDP per capita and openness of the economy induce more FDI. 
In addition, the inflation appears to exert a negative and significant 
effect on FDI.  
 
In conclusion, an important result from empirical analysis is that 
macroeconomic variables have a strong impact on FDI inflows. In addition, 
institutional variables used in the equations also have important effect on 
FDI flows. 
 
Principal Components Analysis 
 
  In order to confirm the results of factor analysis, principal 
components analysis is introduced to the dissertation. 
  The methodology is the same with the factor analysis. I divide 
institutional variables into two groups with the same names; DEMOC and POL. 
DEMOC includes CL, PR and DA. POL includes IP, GS, Corruption, LO, BQ and 
SC. The equations, principal components and loadings are at the below.  
   
 
Eq1; 
_ _ 1.807502 6.66E 05 * _ _
0.057561* _ 0.047372 * 5.03E 06 * _
0.244721* 0.687027 *
Fdi inflows Gdp Gdp pc ppp
Gdp growth Openness Gdp def
DA POL
= − + −
+ + − −
+ +  
Eq4;  
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_ _ 2.326162 0.000115 * _ _
0.063071* _ 0.050718 * 4.01E 06 * _
0.524903 *
Fdi inflows Gdp Gdp pc ppp
Gdp growth Openness Gdp def
GOV
= − +
+ + − −
+  
    
 
 Table 3.  The DEMOC Indicator 
        
 Eigen 
     
Cumulative    
Component Value    Proportion
PC1 2.343134 0.7810
PC2 0.528918 0.9574
PC3 0.127948 1.0000
 
Table 4. Loadings   
    
Variable PC 1   PC 2  PC 3  
N_CL 0.600483 -0.427562 0.675730
N_PR 0.614894 -0.293333 -0.732025
DA 0.511200 0.855071 0.086764
 
DEMOC = pc1 * (0.7810/0.9574) + pc2 * (0.1763/0.9574) 
 
Table 5. The POL Indicator 
         
   Eigen 
       
   Cumulative  
Number Value   Proportion
PC1 2.577193 0.4295
PC2 1.314895 0.6487
PC3 0.806480 0.7831
PC4 0.547529 0.8743
PC5 0.441562 0.9479
PC6 0.312341 1.0000
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Table 6. Loadings  
 
 
 
POL = 
pc1 * 
(0.4295/
0.7831) 
+ pc2 * 
(0.2191/0.7831) + pc3 * (0.1344/0.7831) 
 
 
Table 7.  The GOV indicator 
         
     Eigen  Cumulative   
Number Value    Proportion 
   
PC1 3.204928 0.4006 
PC2 1.602346 0.6009 
PC3 1.093847 0.7376 
PC4 0.715638 0.8271 
PC5 0.574502 0.8989 
PC6 0.418182 0.9512 
PC7 0.265867 0.9844 
PC8 0.124689 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable PC 1   PC 2  PC 3  PC 4  PC 5   PC 6   
    
BQ 0.466171 -0.208069 -0.043562 -0.726545 -0.456950 0.028681 
CORRUPTION 0.339637 -0.526170 0.437696 -0.061226 0.642188 0.007749 
GS 0.343980 0.609048 0.306733 -0.009470 0.099438 0.637711 
IP 0.422484 0.490487 -0.228931 -0.090684 0.333537 -0.639570 
SC 0.382274 -0.239725 -0.748922 0.288428 0.134931 0.366220 
LO 0.473690 -0.104245 0.314875 0.613905 -0.489336 -0.221981 
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     Table 8. Eigenvectors (loadings)       
 
        
Variable PC 1   PC 2  PC 3  PC 4   PC 5  PC 6  PC 7  PC 8   
 
         
BQ 0.355449 0.248195 0.346719 -0.334617 -0.536186 0.524221 -0.132283 0.008445 
DA 0.410244 -0.236257 -0.000361 -0.384031 -0.316569 -0.675044 0.244748 0.112257 
GS 0.257546 0.371123 -0.647204 -0.007104 0.016960 0.233199 0.567103 0.027192 
IP 0.393533 0.250910 -0.347936 0.412291 -0.184246 -0.237828 -0.627587 -0.082208 
LO 0.326915 0.342151 0.141125 -0.444777 0.713727 -0.081655 -0.203169 -0.031069 
N_CL 0.398155 -0.464411 -0.020705 0.197721 0.214205 0.284437 -0.053822 0.675713 
N_PR 0.405262 -0.477945 0.026620 0.126194 0.139349 0.196438 0.110339 -0.721468 
SC 0.233495 0.347443 0.564624 0.563624 0.057850 -0.180013 0.388303 0.041955 
 
           GOV= (0.4006/0.7376*PC1 + 0.2003/0.7376*PC2 + 0.1367/0.7376*PC3) 
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Table 9. Determinants of FDI in developing economies 1984-2005 (Principal 
Components Analysis) 
 
 Eq1  Eq2 Eq3 Eq4 
 
C -2.447698 -1.895822 -1.807502 -2.326162  
    (0.291598)*** (0.301764)*** (0.303315)*** (0.299567)*** 
 
GDP_PC_PPP  0.000134  7.63E-05 6.66E-05 0.000115 
  (3.99E-05)*** (4.06E-05)* (4.07E-05)* (4.10E-05)*** 
 
GDP_GROWTH 0.070019 0.059649 0.057561 0.063071 
  (0.016496)*** (0.016412)*** (0.016404)*** (0.016754)*** 
 
OPENNESS 0.050867 0.047766 0.047372 0.050718 
  (0.004275)*** (0.004255)*** (0.004250)*** (0.004287)*** 
 
GDP_DEF -5.04E-06 -4.47E-06 -5.03E-06 -4.01E-06  
   (2.14E-06)** (2.10E-06)** (2.11E-06)** (2.13E-06)* 
 
DEMOC  0.466172  0.244721 
  (0.093943)***  (0.098804)** 
 
POL  0.775276 0.687027 
   (0.097728)*** (0.103852)*** 
 
GOV    0.524903 
      (0.106365)*** 
 
 
  
In addition to the DEMOC and POL variables, in order to complete the 
analysis, I have substituted in this system of equation including the 
aggregate indicator of governance (GOV), which is calculated as the 
principal component analysis of all the initial indicators. GOV provides a 
summary of the two measures of institutional variable. 
 
Results of the regressions are reported in Table 9.  
This last set of estimations confirms most of the results obtained in the 
factor analysis. The aggregate indicator of governance appears to have a 
positive and significant coefficient, which validates the importance of 
this factor for the foreign firm’s decisions to invest.  
 
My results point out that the effect of macroeconomic indicators such as 
market size, growth rate, GDP per capita on FDI is positive. In addition, 
institutional variables such as; low level of corruption, government 
stability, enforcement of contract law, functioning of judicial system, 
transparent, legal and regulatory framework political and economic 
stability, intellectual property rights, efficiency of justice and 
prudential standards have also significant impact on FDI in developing 
countries. 
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Conclusion 
 
An important result from empirical analysis is that in addition to 
macroeconomic variables, institutional variables used in the equations also 
have important effect on FDI flows. 
 
Anti-competitive practices by the government, consistency and 
unpredictability of officials’ interpretations of regulations, unstable and 
unreliable, non-transparent legal and regulatory framework, problems with 
recognition of patent rights and corruption are significant facts hindering 
the higher level of FDI inflows for foreign investors. 
 
The findings presented in this paper, when incorporated with the existing 
works on FDI, provide an explanation of the distribution of foreign direct 
investment across countries. The empirical results point to the importance 
of political and economic institutions for foreign direct investment.  
 
The theoretical framework and the empirical study in this paper reveal that 
the nature of the interaction between MNCs and each country is the result 
of a more complex set of factors than only market size or market related 
variables orientation. It takes place within the host country’s unique 
economic, social, and legal structures; it involves institutions.  
 
Generally, legal infrastructures, including legal system development and 
enforcement, are generally weak in most developing countries. Bribery and 
corruption are obviously more invasive in emerging markets than advanced 
economies. It is generally less difficult to enact and develop various 
laws, but political, social, historical or cultural factors often impede 
the implementation and enforcement of these laws. The roles of law and 
judicial systems differ among countries. The gap between the law on the 
books and the law in practice can be vast. Legal standards tend to be 
ideals, not necessarily achievable. 
 
A stable, reliable, business climate will lower costs, thereby encouraging 
FDI. Avoiding problems with regulatory, bureaucratic and judicial hurdles, 
property rights, enforceable contracts, performance and content 
requirements, or bribe payments will be seen as positive because they 
reduce risk and uncertainty. Basically, the more obstacles that companies 
perceive they will have to face in a host country, the less attractive it 
becomes. The ability to communicate, to access information and to transport 
internally is useful to investors because they can reduce costs of 
 21
developing the infrastructure necessary to them. 
 
Then the key to economic growth, to attract higher levels of FDI is finding 
the right institutional framework that will unlock a nation’s wealth 
potential. 
 
Appendix 
  
 
Table 1. Kaiser's Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy Factor  
 
 MSA    
BQ 0.812422  
-CL 0.648760  
CORRUPTION 0.722596  
DA 0.817637  
GS 0.521575  
IP 0.648647  
LO 0.779073  
-PR 0.641195  
SC 0.562240  
Kaiser's MSA 0.682332  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Loadings  
     
 F1 F2 Communality Uniqueness  
 
BQ  0.252434  0.576206  0.395737  0.849397  
-CL  0.872058  0.027706  0.761253  0.236223  
CORRUPTION  0.172899  0.408804  0.197015  0.975294  
DA  0.600097  0.311355  0.457058  0.604062  
GS  0.070363  0.431288  0.190960  0.989448  
IP  0.307158  0.484339  0.328930  0.884439  
LO  0.179625  0.602603  0.395396  0.812053  
-PR  0.995968 -0.008292  0.992021  0.007977  
SC  0.105272  0.442236  0.206655  0.973236  
      
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion  
F1  2.348815  2.348815  0.772606  0.598421  
F2  1.576209  3.925024 ---  0.401579  
Total  3.925024  6.273840   1.000000  
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Table 3. Ordinary correlations 
  
     
 N_CL N_PR DA
 
N_CL 1.000000   
N_PR 0.868210 1.000000  
DA 0.533396 0.595737 1.000000
 
 
Table 4. Ordinary correlations     
        
 BQ CORRUPTION GS IP SC LO 
 
BQ 1.000000      
CORRUPTION 0.431472 1.000000     
GS 0.225273 0.018046 1.000000    
IP 0.344476 0.045719 0.598424 1.000000   
SC 0.412484 0.265579 0.039017 0.332288 1.000000  
LO 0.439087 0.438021 0.345452 0.332192 0.351758 1.000000 
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